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BUCKLEW V. PRECYTHE’S RETURN TO THE 
ORIGINAL MEANING OF “UNUSUAL”: 
PROHIBITING EXTENSIVE DELAYS ON DEATH 
ROW 
 
JACOB LEON* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court, in Bucklew v. Precythe, provided an originalist interpretation 
of the term “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
This originalist interpretation asserted that the word “unusual” proscribes punishments 
that have “long fallen out of use.” To support its interpretation, the Supreme Court 
cited John Stinneford’s well-known law review article, The Original Meaning of 
“Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation. This Article, as 
Bucklew did, accepts Stinneford’s interpretation of the word “unusual” as correct. 
Under Stinneford’s interpretation, the term “unusual” is a legal term of art derived 
from eighteenth-century common law that means “contrary to long usage.” Simply 
put, Stinneford defines “unusual” to proscribe punishments that are “new” against the 
backdrop of eighteenth-century common law. 
Under Stinneford’s interpretation of “unusual,” decade-long delays on death row 
are “contrary to long usage” and consequently “unusual” under the Eighth 
Amendment. This Article proves that decade-long delays on death row are “contrary 
to long usage” in two steps. First, it demonstrates that our Constitution’s framers 
adopted the principle of immediate punishment articulated by Cesare Beccaria in the 
Enlightenment Era. Second, with data gathered from approximately 150 execution 
delays in eight states during 1770-1791, this Article shows that no sentence-to-
execution delay exceeding three months enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth 
century-common law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two principles have been established in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence for approximately sixty years. First, to decide whether a 
punishment is “cruel and unusual,” the Court analyzes whether the punishment 
corresponds with a maturing society’s “evolving standards of decency.”1 Second, the 
Court’s application of the “evolving standards of decency” test has remained 
inconsistent for sixty years.2 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court appeared to erase both 
principles in its 2019 capital punishment opinion, Bucklew v. Precythe,3 by not once 
mentioning the evolving-standards test when deciding whether a lethal injection 
protocol was “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment. Instead, in Bucklew, 
the Court determined whether a lethal injection protocol violated a person’s Eighth 
Amendment right by interpreting the phrase “cruel and unusual” with originalist 
methods.  
Bucklew bifurcated “cruel and unusual” into two distinct requirements and 
interpreted each term by turning back the clock to the eighteenth century.4 The Court 
defined the term “cruel” by consulting Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English 
Language—the fourth edition published in 1773.5 That dictionary was the “standard 
authority” for common folks in 1787–1791,6 the period in which the Eighth 
Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” language was proposed, debated, and ratified. 
Johnson’s dictionary defined “cruel” as “[p]leased with hurting others; inhuman; hard-
hearted; void of pity; wanting compassion; savage; barbarous; unrelenting.”7  
Next, and more interestingly, Bucklew interpreted the word “unusual” to proscribe 
punishments that “had long fallen out of use.”8 As support, the Court cited John 
Stinneford’s well-known law review article, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The 
 
1
 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
2 Indeed, the evolving-standards test has produced jurisprudence akin to a “train wreck.” 
Benjamin Wittes, What Is “Cruel and Unusual”?, HOOVER INSTIT. (Dec. 1, 2005), 
https://www.hoover.org/research/what-cruel-and-unusual. See also Youngjae Lee, The 
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 684 (2005) (describing 
the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as “ineffectual and incoherent”); Tom Stacy, 
Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 475 (2005) 
(describing the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as a “mess”); Jeffrey Omar Usman, 
State Legislatures and Solving the Eighth Amendment Ratchet Puzzle, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
677, 679 (2018) (describing the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as a “one-way 
ratchet” with “no workable solution” for state governments).  
3 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).   
4
 Id. at 1122–26. 
5 Id. at 1123. 
6 MICHAEL J. PERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MORAL CONTROVERSY, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 57 n.10 (2009). 
7 Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1123 (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)). 
8
 Id.  
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Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation.9 In that article, Stinneford contends 
that the term “unusual” is a legal term of art—derived from eighteenth-century 
common law—which means “contrary to long usage” or, stated differently, “an 
innovation.”10 Stinneford basically defines “cruel and unusual” to proscribe 
punishments that are “cruel and new” against the backdrop of eighteenth-century 
common law.11  
Legal scholars have provided notable counterarguments to Stinneford’s 
scholarship.12 Yet, as Bucklew did, this Article accepts Stinneford’s interpretation of 
the word “unusual” as correct. If Stinneford’s interpretation of “unusual” is correct, 
several contemporary punishments are “unusual” under the Eighth Amendment—
including mass incarceration, lethal injection, and supermax prisons—because those 
punishment practices did not enjoy “long usage” in eighteenth-century common law.  
This Article proves that decade-long delays on death row are likewise “contrary to 
long usage.” First, this Article demonstrates that our Constitution’s framers, who were 
substantially influenced by the Enlightenment, adopted the principle of immediate 
punishment articulated by Cesare Beccaria, a revolutionary Enlightenment thinker.13 
Second, this Article proves that no sentence-to-execution delay exceeding three 
months14 enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth century-common law.15 Although 
scholars routinely suggest that death sentences were quickly implemented in the 
eighteenth century,16 no scholar has yet provided comprehensive data that displays 
 
9
 Id.  
10 John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar 
to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745, 1768–69 [hereinafter Stinneford, The 
Original Meaning of “Unusual”]. 
11 Bucklew and Stinneford’s approach is far astray from the Supreme Court’s normal analysis 
of the term “unusual.” The Court often declines to individually interpret the term “unusual” in 
Eighth Amendment decisions. Instead, it often combines the two distinct requirements of “cruel 
and unusual” into one test—whether a punishment violates society’s “evolving standards of 
decency.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
12
 See, e.g., John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s 
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 268 (2009) 
[hereinafter Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision] (arguing that that the term “unusual” “has 
always had—and continues to have—a straightforward dictionary definition” and, in common 
parlance, it “simply means not usual, not common or rare”). See also PERRY, supra note 6, at 
57–58 (arguing that the ordinary man on the street likely would have understood “unusual” as 
Samuel Johnson’s A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE defined the word—not as 
Stinneford’s legal term of art). 
13
 See infra Part III.A. 
14 This number excludes outliers. But if outliers are included, no sentence-to-execution delay 
exceeding 9.4 months enjoyed “long usage.” See infra Part III.B. 
15 See infra Part III.B. 
16 See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman's Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 55 (2012) (“[A] wealth of historical evidence demonstrate[s] that the 
Framers of the Eighth Amendment considered significant delays between imposition of a death 
sentence and its execution to be cruel and unusual punishment.”). See also Dwight Aarons, Can 
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the average sentence-to-execution delay during that period. This Article, with data 
gathered from approximately 150 execution delays in eight states during 1770–
1791,17 provides enough data to show that no sentence-to-execution delay exceeding 
three months enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth century.  
Simply put, because any delay exceeding three months did not enjoy “long usage” 
in Anglo-American law, such delays are “unusual” under Stinneford and Bucklew’s 
interpretation.18 If the Supreme Court is returning to the original public meaning of 
the term “unusual,” it should make the return a principled one.19 A principled return 
requires the Supreme Court to hold that any sentence-to-execution delay exceeding 
three months results in an “unusual” punishment.20  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Original Public Meaning of the Term “Unusual” 
1. Stinneford’s Interpretation 
Stinneford asserts that the term “unusual” proscribes any punishment that is 
“contrary to long usage,” or, stated differently, “an innovation.”21 Simply put, an 
“unusual” punishment is an innovative punishment that replaces traditional 
 
Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 179 (1998) (“The time from the imposition of a 
death sentence to the execution was not long” in Colonial America); Kathleen M. Flynn, The 
"Agony of Suspense": How Protracted Death Row Confinement Gives Rise to an Eighth 
Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 291, 299–300 
(1997) (“[H]istory demonstrates that early American courts and legislatures did not permit 
prolonged death row delay.”). 
17
 Those eight states are Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. 
18 See infra Part III.B. 
19 Whether the Court’s originalist methods will be principled—or selectively applied—is yet 
to be determined. The forecast is not bright and sunny if you are wishing for principled 
originalism instead of selective originalism. In Bucklew, Justice Gorsuch cited William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries to demonstrate how methods that “had fallen out of use” were 
“unusual.” See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123 (2019). But Justice Gorsuch cherry-
picked information within Blackstone’s Commentaries. He failed to mention that Blackstone’s 
Commentaries—the exact version he cited—in turn cited and adopted Beccaria’s immediate-
punishment principle. See infra text accompanying notes 66–68. That principle forbids 
excessive delays on death row.  
20
 This Article concentrates only on the term “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment. Whether 
extensive sentence-to-execution delays are “cruel” under an original-public-meaning approach 
is not within the scope of this Article. But Peter Baumann persuasively argued that 
contemporary delays on death row are “cruel” as John Stinneford defines the term. See generally 
Peter Baumann, “Waiting on Death”: Nathan Dunlap and the Cruel Effect of Uncertainty, 106 
GEO. L.J. 871 (2018). 
21
 Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1767 (citations omitted). 
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punishments slowly developed over a very long period of time in eighteenth-century 
common law—but not the typical “judge-made” common law that legal scholars 
typically imagine. Instead, according to Stinneford, lawyers and judges in the 
eighteenth century considered common law to be “customary law,” which is the “law 
of long use and custom.”22 Long usage helped discern “rights and duties,” and it 
helped justify state action, including the implementation of punishments.23  
Stinneford cites Sir Edward Coke—often considered “the most important common 
law jurist in English history”24—to demonstrate how long usage in common law 
provided the “most reliable basis for determining the goodness of a law because it 
established both that the law was reasonable” and “enjoyed the consent of the 
people.”25 Coke did not hide his fear and distaste of innovative punishments. He 
argued that common law could “utterly crush” any “drosse and sophistications of 
novelties and new inventions.”26  
2. Innovative Punishments 
Stinneford divides innovative punishments into three central categories. The first 
category proscribes “punishment practices that were either entirely new or were 
foreign to the common law system.”27 This category likely would proscribe most 
twenty-first century punishments—such as lethal injections, supermax prisons, mass 
incarceration, and gas chambers—and, most importantly, decade-long delays on death 
row. By contrast, execution via firing squad would not be innovative because judges 
commonly approved of that practice in eighteenth-century rulings.28  
Stinneford’s second category precludes punishments that are “newly married to 
crimes with which they had not traditionally been associated.”29 This category would 
prohibit, for example, the government from transforming a driving-while-intoxicated 
(DWI) offense into a capital crime because DWI offenses always have entailed less 
serious punishments.30 Finally, the third category prohibits traditional punishments 
 
22 Id. at 1768 (citations omitted). 
23 Id. at 1770. 
24 Id. at 1771. 
25 Id. at 1774–75. 
26 Id. at 1788 (quoting EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1608), 
reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE § 33, 563, 563 
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003)) (citations omitted). 
27 Id. at 1745. For instance, the framers feared that the federal government would replace the 
common law system with crimes used in civil jurisdictions. 
28
 See John Stinneford, Original Meaning and the Death Penalty, 13 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 44, 59 (2018). 
29 Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1746. 
30
 Early History of Drunk Driving Laws, NEWS WHEEL (June 17, 2015), 
https://thenewswheel.com/early-history-of-drunk-driving-laws/. 
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that fall entirely out of usage but are subsequently revived.31 Brutal punishments that 
in fact enjoyed long usage in the eighteenth century—such as the “ducking stool”32—
would be outlawed under this category because, as Bucklew noted, such punishments 
have fallen out of use.33  
III. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
Stinneford’s three categories force courts to determine whether punishments 
enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth century. To discover what type of delay 
enjoyed “long usage” during that period, this part first shows that America’s framers 
viewed immediate punishment as a necessity when implementing capital punishment. 
The framers explicitly adopted Cesare Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle 
from the Enlightenment era.34 Second, this part supports that showing with research 
on sentence-to-execution delays and crime-to-execution delays in the New England 
states, as well as New York and New Jersey, from 1770 to 1791.35 That sampling of 
states shows the death penalty practices that prevailed in that era. 
A. The Framers’ Views on Immediate Punishment 
 The Constitution’s framers were significantly influenced by an array of 
Enlightenment thinkers.36 Their perspectives on criminal law, particularly capital 
 
31  Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1746.  
32
 A ducking stool was a “device for punishing scolds by repeatedly plunging them 
underwater.” Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (8th ed. 2004)). 
33
 Stinneford uses James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220 (Pa. 1825), to demonstrate 
how a Pennsylvania court determined that the “ducking stool” had fallen out of use. See 
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1813–1814. There are three 
ways in which a punishment could “cease to be authorized by the common law.” Id. at 1814. A 
punishment could “[1] fall completely out of usage for a long period of time; [2] it could be 
used in England, but not America (and thus never attain “usual” status on this side of the 
Atlantic); or [3] it could be disallowed by legislative reform.” Id. In James, the court noted that 
no one in England endured the ducking stool since the middle of the seventeenth century. Id. 
(citing James, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 227). Moreover, “it had never become part of the common 
law usage of Pennsylvania.” Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, 
at 1814. And, even if it had, the Pennsylvania legislature implicitly disallowed the ducking stool 
when it prohibited the whipping post in 1790. Id.  
34 See infra Part III.A.2. 
35 See infra Part III.B. 
36 See, e.g., Immanuel V. Chioco, Looking Beyond the Veil, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
547, 553 (2017) (“Many of the Framers, such as Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and James 
Madison, were deeply influenced by their contemporary figures in the European Enlightenment, 
such as John Calvin, John Locke, and Montesquieu.”); John D. Bessler, The Italian 
Enlightenment and the American Revolution: Cesare Beccaria’s Forgotten Influence on 
American Law, 37 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. 1, 32 (2016) (demonstrating 
that “in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries” numerous framers were influenced 
by Enlightenment thinker Cesare Beccaria); Samuel R. Olken, The Refracted Constitution: 
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punishment, exponentially progressed from the mid-1750s to the latter part of the 
eighteenth century.37 That progress occurred in large part because of Cesare 
Beccaria’s succinct treatise: An Essay on Crimes and Punishments.38 His treatise 
covered many subjects but, at its core, it analyzed the theory of criminal law with a 
level of humanity never before realized.39 America’s framers were familiar with 
England’s Bloody Code,40 which permitted the government to kill citizens for several 
minor crimes.41 The framers considered that approach to be vicious in nature due to 
the significant bloodshed it produced.42 
By introducing humanity into the criminal law system, in light of the immoral 
Bloody Code, Beccaria significantly influenced the framers’ views on setting and 
implementing punishments. Indeed, the Constitution’s most prominent framers 
studied Beccaria in some shape or form. Among those who read and studied Beccaria’s 
writings include George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James 
Madison, John Quincy Adams, Aaron Burr, John Witherspoon, Benjamin Franklin, 
Dr. Benjamin Rush, William Bradford Jr., John Hancock, Justice James Wilson, and 
Chief Justice John Jay.43 To understand the framers’ views on punishment, one must 
first understand Beccaria and his punishment principles.  
1. Cesare Beccaria and His Punishment Principles 
Beccaria was born in Milan in 1738.44 To pursue his scholarly dreams, he left 
Milan to attend a Jesuit college in Parma.45 He subsequently enrolled in the University 
of Pavia from 1754 to 1758, where he studied law.46 Beccaria received his law degree 
 
Classical Liberalism and the Lessons of History, 101 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 97, 101 (2016) 
(“[H]istorians agree that the Framers drew upon the ideas of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and 
Montesquieu, and were influenced in no small measure by the Enlightenment.”).  
37 See JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE 
FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 55–65 (2012) [hereinafter BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL]. 
38
 See, e.g., LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865 52 (1989); id. at 55–56. 
39 See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 37, at 55–56. 
40 Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision, supra note 12, at 262. 
41 Id. at 268 (Blackstone recounted “approximately 160 different crimes punishable by 
death”). 
42 Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment’s Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth 
Century, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405, 439–43 (2016). 
43
 JOHN D. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 151–219 (2014) [hereinafter BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW].  
44 Id. at 28. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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and afterward returned to Milan in his twenties.47 As a young scholar, he studied 
prominent works of political philosophy written by Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, David Hume, and other Enlightenment thinkers.48 Once he became well-
read in Enlightenment texts, Beccaria joined a social group that regularly discussed 
foundational philosophical topics.49 Those discussions and, particularly, his 
admiration of Montesquieu’s books,50 gave birth to one of the most revolutionary 
treatises ever written on criminal law: Beccaria’s An Essay on Crimes and 
Punishments.51 
Beccaria’s treatise, first published in 1764, inspired leaders all over the world to 
reform penal systems with Beccaria’s new and progressive principles of 
punishment.52 His most well-known principle called for proportional punishments 
because they “make the most efficacious and lasting impression on the minds of men 
with the least torment to the body of the condemned.”53 The framers wholly adopted 
Beccaria’s proportionality principle in light of England’s vicious Bloody Code,54 
which permitted the death penalty for more than 160 crimes.55  
Yet, most importantly for purposes of this Article, the framers also adopted one of 
Beccaria’s lesser-known principles—immediate punishment. Beccaria asserted that 
immediate punishments are absolutely necessary.56 In his words, a punishment is 
“more just and useful” when conducted “immediately after the commission of a crime” 
because it “spares the criminal the cruel and superfluous torment of uncertainty.”57 
This principle is especially important for capital punishment because the torment of 
uncertainty—while one awaits execution—increases “in proportion to the strength of 
 
47 Id. 
48 See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 37, at 34; MASUR, supra note 38, at 51. 
49 MASUR, supra note 38, at 52. 
50 Montesquieu Persian Letters and, especially, his The Spirit of Laws, greatly influenced 
Beccaria. Id.; see also BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 37, at 37. Montesquieu 
asserted that no government should violate a citizen’s liberty with extreme torture. MASUR, 
supra note 38, at 51. 
51
 MASUR, supra note 38, at 51. 
52 BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 3. 
53 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 37, at 37. 
54
 See BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 155, 163–64, 182, 189, 204, 217 
(demonstrating that George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Justice James 
Wilson, Aaron Burr, and Benjamin Franklin all favored proportional punishments); see also 
Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for 
the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 183–84 (2008). 
55
 Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision, supra note 12, at 18 (2009) (Blackstone recounted 
“approximately 160 different crimes punishable by death”). 
56
 CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS WITH A COMMENTARY 
ATTRIBUTED TO M. DE VOLTAIRE 75 (1778). 
57 Id. at 73. 
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[the defendant’s] imagination and the sense of his weakness.”58 Beccaria suggested 
that it is ruthless to force a prisoner to endure extended and “painful anxiety.”59  
Beccaria further justified his immediate-punishment principle because it advanced 
penological goals, such as deterrence of future crimes.60 The “degree of the 
punishment, and the consequences of a crime” should produce “the greatest possible 
effect on others, with the least possible pain to the delinquent.”61 To meet this end, an 
“immediate punishment is more useful,” Beccaria argues, “because the smaller the 
interval of time between the punishment and the crime, the stronger and more lasting 
will be the association of the two ideas of Crime and Punishment.”62 Put another way, 
if criminals know that illegal acts produce prompt consequences, they will be less 
likely to commit crimes in the first place. In sum, Beccaria justified his immediate-
punishment principle because it saved the prisoner from unnecessary torture while 
simultaneously deterring future crimes.  
2. America’s Framers and the Immediate-Punishment Principle 
America’s framers explicitly adopted Beccaria’s immediate-punishment 
principle.63 We begin with Thomas Jefferson, whose Bill for Proportioning Crimes 
and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital in 1779 declared that “whenever 
sentence of death shall have been pronounced against any person . . . execution shall 
be done on the next day but one after sentence, unless it be Sunday, and then on the 
Monday following.”64 As support, Jefferson’s Bill cited Chapter 19 of Beccaria’s 
treatise, which argued that immediate punishments are necessary.65  
Similarly, the prominent William Blackstone, who the framers repeatedly cited 
throughout the founding era, cited Chapter 19 of Beccaria’s treatise to support 
immediate punishment.66 Blackstone emphasized that a judge “before whom any 
person is found guilty of willful murder” must direct the prisoner “to be executed on 
the next day but one” because a quick turnaround reduces the “short but awful interval 
 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. at 74. 
60
 See id. at 76. 
61
 Id. at 74. 
62 Id. 
63
 See, e.g., BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 164–65, 168, 170, 212, 216; 
see also Braatz, supra note 42, at 439–43; Vikrant P. Reddy & Marc A. Levin, Right on Crime: 
A Return to First Principles for American Conservatives, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 231, 249 
(2014); Ursula Bentele, Back to an International Perspective on the Death Penalty as a Cruel 
Punishment: The Example of South Africa, 73 TUL. L. REV. 251, 303 (1998). 
64
 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, in MEMOIR, 
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 125 (citing 
Beccaria § 19; 25 G. 2 c. 37). 
65
 Id. 
66
 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 397 (1769). 
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between sentence and execution.”67 Blackstone noted “it is of great importance” that 
capital punishment “follow[s] the crime as early as possible.” 68  
Jefferson and Blackstone were not the only framers and legal commentators to 
explicitly adopt Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle. One of President George 
Washington’s original Supreme Court nominees, Justice James Wilson, routinely cited 
Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle with approval. Justice James Wilson—a 
crucial framer who often spoke at the Constitutional Convention—showed “plain 
admiration” for Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle.69 Justice Wilson adopted 
Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle for both inferior offenses and capital 
punishment. He argued that “an inferiour offence should be inflicted with much 
expedition” after the sentence because it will “strengthen the useful association 
between [crime and punishment]; one appearing as the immediate and unavoidable 
consequence of the other.”70  
Moreover, in discussing capital punishment, Justice Wilson paraphrased 
Beccaria’s treatise and argued that “speedy punishment should form a part of every 
system of criminal jurisprudence.”71 Government must implement a punishment 
“soon after the commission of the crime,” Justice Wilson argues, because it “should 
never be forgotten, that imprisonment . . . in itself [is] a punishment—a punishment 
galling to some of the finest feelings of the heart” and may be “as undeserved as it is 
distressing.”72 The prisoner “undergoes the corroding torment of suspense—the 
keenest agony, perhaps, which falls to the lot of suffering humanity.”73 Justice Wilson 
followed Beccaria’s guidance in issuing a grand jury charge in 1791 when he stated 
that capital punishments “should not be aggravated by any sufferings, except those 
which are inseparably attached to a violent death.”74  
Furthermore, another one of President George Washington’s original Supreme 
Court nominees, Chief Justice John Jay, followed Beccaria’s guidance concerning 
immediate punishment. Chief Justice Jay, in a letter to his wife, asserted that “[d]elays 
 
67
 Id. at 201–02. 
68
 Id. 
69 BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 164–65; see also Michael J. Zydney 
Mannheimer, Not the Crime but the Cover-Up: A Deterrence-Based Rationale for the 
Premeditation-Deliberation Formula, 86 IND. L.J. 879, 913 (2011). 
70
 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 629 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter 
WILSON]. 
71 Id. at 630. 
72 Id. at 629; see also Baumann, supra note 20. 
73
 WILSON, supra note 70, at 629. 
74
 BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 164 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).  
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in punishing crimes encourage commission of crime.”75 Thus, the “more certain and 
speedy the punishment, the fewer will be the objects.”76  
Finally, Beccaria’s wisdom shaped the beliefs of other founders who do not receive 
extensive discussions in American history books. These founders include President 
Washington’s second United States Attorney General, William Bradford Jr., who is 
described as the “Enlightenment literati” of Philadelphia.77 Bradford—who 
befriended James Madison while studying at the College of New Jersey in 177278—
served as a State Supreme Court Justice and State Attorney General in Pennsylvania 
before being appointed by President Washington to serve as the nation’s top law-
enforcement official.79  
Bradford’s advice was requested in a letter from President George Washington’s 
future Secretary of State, Timothy Pickering, regarding a potential procedural right 
that would have enabled a “party accused before a court of oyer and terminer to 
remove the proceedings into the Supreme Court.”80 In response, Bradford stated that 
it “is the opinion of Beccaria, and all enlightened philosophers on the subject, that 
punishment should follow the crime as quickly as possible.”81 Bradford disagreed 
with providing a party with that procedural right because it violated Beccaria’s 
immediate-punishment principle. The procedural right postponed “the punishment till 
the remembrance and destination of the crime is weakened or lost.”82  
In sum, several framers were deeply affected by Beccaria’s An Essay on Crimes 
and Punishments. The framers employed Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle 
when drafting legislation and conducting judicial proceedings in the capital-
punishment context. This is crucial for understanding how long a prisoner may await 
execution because, under Stinneford’s interpretation, a punishment must have enjoyed 
“long usage” in Anglo-American law. As exhibited above, America’s framers and 
early judges eschewed extensive delays between sentence and punishment.  
B. Swift Implementation of Death Sentences from 1770 to 1791 
America’s framers wanted capital defendants to immediately be executed after 
sentencing. Yet, during the late eighteenth century, it was not “contrary to long usage” 
 
75 Id. at 168 (citations omitted). 
76
 Id. (citations omitted). 
77
 Id. at 170 (quoting 2 OCTAVIUS PICKERING, LIFE OF TIMOTHY PICKERING 434 (Applewood 
Books ed. 2009)).  
78  Id.  
79
 Id.; Respublica v. Lacaze, 2 U.S. 118, 119 (1791) (listing William Bradford as 
Pennsylvania’s Attorney General).  
80
 BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 171. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. 
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for prisoners to await execution for weeks or months after sentencing.83 To determine 
the specific delays that enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth century, as Stinneford’s 
interpretation demands, this section reviews how quickly death sentences were 
implemented from 1770 to 1791.84  
There were approximately 550 to 600 death sentences implemented from 1770 to 
1791 in the United States.85 The data below is limited to the New England states—
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont—
plus New York and New Jersey. Those eight states accounted for about 290 
executions.86 It was difficult to locate either the sentence date, crime date, or execution 
date for more than 50% of the 290 executions. Thus, to provide different sample sets, 
both (1) sentence-to-execution delays and (2) crime-to-execution delays are 
provided.87  
1. Sentence-to-Execution Delays from 1770 to 1791 
This section analyzes sentence-to-execution delays in the New England states, 
New Jersey, and New York from 1770 to 1791. Sources failed to provide a sentence 
date or an execution date for the vast majority of capital defendants during this period. 
The most common deficiency was the absence of a sentence date. As a result, the 
sample size is limited to fifty prisoners who were executed from 1770 to 1791. The 
results are demonstrated in Table 1 below.88 
 
83
 See infra Part III.B. 
84 The analysis ends with 1791 because the meaning of “unusual” became locked once the 
Eighth Amendment was ratified in that year. Put another way, the meaning of “unusual” cannot 
change under an original-public-meaning theory post-1791 (barring a constitutional 
amendment). 
85
 This number was gathered with Mike Epsy’s historic legal-execution registry. See 
Executions in the U.S. 1608-2002: The Espy File, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-us-1608-2002-espy-file (last visited Jan. 21, 2020). 
86 See DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW ENGLAND: A COMPREHENSIVE 
REFERENCE, 1623-1960, 151–80 (1999) [hereinafter HEARN, NEW ENGLAND]; DANIEL ALLEN 
HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY: A COMPREHENSIVE REGISTRY, 1691-1963 30–62 
(2005) [hereinafter HEARN, NEW JERSEY]; DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW 
YORK STATE: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE, 1639-1963 17–27 (1997) [hereinafter HEARN, 
NEW YORK]. 
87 The two groups contain a significant amount of overlap. The sentence-to-execution chart 
below provides data on 50 capital defendants, and the crime-to-execution chart provides data 
on 108 capital defendants. A vast majority of the 50 capital defendants—in the sentence chart—
are also represented in the crime chart.  
88
 The execution date for each prisoner derives from Daniel Hearn’s three comprehensive 
registries. See supra note 86. Yet, because Hearn did not have the sentence date for a vast 
majority of the capital defendants, I used multiple sources to collect the sentence date for each 
capital defendant. Those sources may be found in Appendix A.  
Furthermore, here are some important assumptions embedded in the sentence-to-execution 
chart:  
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
498 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:485 
 
 
At the outset, the average sentence-to-execution delay was 1.14 months from 1770 
to 1791.89 Yet there are different ways to review the data. If the two outliers—4.9 and 
9.4 months—are excluded, the average sentence-to-execution delay decreases to 0.90 
months.90 Alternatively, if the American Revolution years (1775 to 1783) are 
excluded because a majority—but not all—of those executions were conducted very 
quickly for war crimes,91 the average sentence-to-execution delay increases to 2.01 
 
(1) In researching “sentence” dates, I also included “conviction” and “trial” dates. If more 
than one date was available, the sentence date usurped the conviction date, and the conviction 
date usurped the trial date. This should not cause a significant disparity because most eighteenth-
century defendants were tried and convicted on the same day they were sentenced.  
(2) If multiple people were convicted or sentenced on the same day for a group crime, I 
counted each member as one sentence-to-execution delay.  
(3) I assumed each month contains 30 days. 
89 See supra Table 1.  
90 See id. 
91 See, e.g., HEARN, NEW JERSEY, supra note 86, at 35–56.  
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months.92 But the sample size dwindles to nineteen capital defendants without the 
American Revolution years, which produces an unreliable result (for almost 600 
executions). Either way, no non-arbitrary calculation produces an average sentence-
to-execution delay exceeding 2.01 months.93  
The question then becomes what type of delay enjoyed “long usage” from 1770 to 
1791. Stinneford does not draw a bright line to distinguish innovative punishments 
from punishments that were seldom employed over a long period of time—outliers—
but still utilized and agreed upon once or twice per decade in Anglo-American law. 
Should outliers be discarded? The answer is probably “yes” when considering why 
punishments must have enjoyed long usage in the first place. The common law 
afforded the “most reliable basis for determining the goodness [and reasonableness] 
of a law.” At its core, the common law demonstrated whether a law “enjoyed the 
consent of the people.”94 An outlier punishment—abnormally occurring once or twice 
per decade—likely did not occur often enough to test whether it in fact enjoyed “the 
consent of the people” in the first place.95  
Nevertheless, this Article takes the safe route and calculates the results both with 
and without outliers. If outliers are included, any sentence-to-execution delay 
exceeding 9.4 months—the most extensive delay—did not enjoy long usage in Anglo-
American law.96 By contrast, if outliers are discarded,97 any sentence-to-execution 
delay exceeding three months did not enjoy long usage in Anglo-American law.98 
Indeed, only 3.77% of prisoners awaited execution for more than three months from 
1770 to 1791.99  
This three-month conclusion is further supported by Chief Justice John Marshall. 
While still practicing law in Virginia in 1793, Chief Justice Marshall filed a clemency 
petition for a prisoner who awaited execution for five months after sentencing.100 He 
requested that the prisoner’s clemency petition be granted—and the sentence be 
reduced—in part because the prisoner suffered during the extensive five-month 
delay.101 In Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “the prisoner hath languished a long time 
in jail, in a situation which must have added to the misories [sic] of imprisonment, & 
 
92
 See supra Table 1. 
93 See id. 
94 Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1774–75. 
95 That is true unless the punishment already had a long history of favoritism in Anglo-
American law. No evidence shows prisoner awaiting execution before 1770 for more than three 
months.  
96 See supra Table 1.  
97 This calculation discards the two most extensive delays and the two shortest delays.  
98 See supra Table 1. 
99 Id. 
100 Petition to the Governor & Council of Virginia (Sept. 2, 1973), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN 
MARSHALL 207 (Charles T. Cullen & Herbert A. Johnson eds., 1977). 
101 Id. at 208.  
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the horrors of an execution, which agony alone hath suspended.” Virginia’s 
government, in response, granted the clemency petition.102  
2. Crime-to-Execution Delays from 1770 to 1791 
This section analyzes crime-to-execution delays in the New England states, New 
York, and New Jersey from 1770 to 1791. The crime-to-execution data provides a 
more significant sample size of 108 executions—more than a 100% increase—in 
comparison to the sentence-to-execution sample size.103 Each capital defendant’s 
crime date from 1770–1791 is more easily accessible than each capital defendant’s 
sentence date. Although crime-to-execution delays do not provide a concrete 
measurement of how many days each prisoner awaited execution after sentencing, it 
does provide the absolute maximum number of days any prisoner could have awaited 
execution. That is because no person is convicted and awaiting execution before the 
crime itself transpires.  
Now, with a larger sample size, the data may be divided into two periods: 1770–
1786 and 1787–1791. This permits the reader to focus on 1787–1791: the period in 
which the Eighth Amendment—including the term “unusual”—was written, 
proposed, debated, and ratified. The results are demonstrated in the chart below.104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 Id. 
103 See supra Table 1; see also infra Table 2. The petitioner’s clemency petition being granted 
likewise shows that the two outliers on the sentence-to-execution chart (9.4 months and 4.9 
months) did not enjoy long usage and thus should not be considered. 
104
 This chart’s data derives from Daniel Hearn’s three comprehensive registries. See supra 
note 86. The chart above handled Thomas Bird—the first federal death penalty case—
differently than other crime-to-execution delays. Bird, a crew member, killed his ship’s captain 
while at sea in the summer of 1788. JERRY GENESIO, PORTLAND NECK: THE HANGING OF 
THOMAS BIRD 25 (2010). The ship remained at sea for one year after the murder, and Bird did 
not reach land (Maine) until the summer of 1789. Id. at 26. The chart used the ship’s landing 
date—July 1789—because it is well-known that Bird was not tried or convicted until the ship 
reached Maine. Id. at 42–49.  
Here are other assumptions embedded in Table 2:  
(1) If Hearn provided only the month in which the capital defendant committed the crime—
“June” or “July,” for example—then I assumed the first day of that month: “June 1” or “July 
1.” Yet I did not include any defendant if his or her exact execution date was unavailable.  
(2) If a defendant committed multiple crimes on different dates, I chose the latest date.  
(3) If a group of people committed one crime—four men killed one woman, for example—I 
counted that scenario as producing four distinct crimes. Thus, those four men would produce 
four markers on Table 2.  
(4) I assumed each month contains 30 days. 
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Let us start with 1770 to 1786. The average crime-to-execution delay for that 
period was 3.66 months. The shortest delay, 0.03 months, transpired in 1781 and the 
lengthiest delay, 10.27 months, occurred in 1770.105 Unlike the sentence-to-execution 
chart, the crime-to-execution chart does not produce any material outliers for 1770–
1786 because the delays are generally distributed from one month to ten months.106 
Thus, despite the average crime-to-execution delay being 3.66 months, it was not 
“contrary to long usage” for capital defendants to endure a crime-to-execution delay 
of ten months from 1770 to 1786.  
Yet the most essential inference derives from 1787 to 1791 because that is when 
the Eighth Amendment was proposed, debated, and ratified. The chart above provides 
crime-to-execution data on twenty-six capital defendants from 1787 to 1791.107 A few 
observations are in order. First, an average prisoner awaited execution for 4.23 months 
after committing a capital crime.108 Second, the shortest crime-to-execution delay was 
 
105 See supra Table 2. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
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0.67 months and the most extensive delay was 12.83 months.109 Third, no outliers are 
present in the crime-to-execution chart. Therefore, no crime-to-execution delay 
exceeding 12.83 months enjoyed “long usage” in Anglo-American law.110 Those 
findings do not provide a concrete average of how many months a prisoner in fact 
awaited execution after sentencing.111 But the findings do provide the absolute 
maximum each prisoner could have awaited execution: 12.83 months. 
In sum, the initial sentence-to-execution chart analyzed fifty of the approximate 
600 U.S. executions from 1770 to 1791. That chart sufficiently demonstrated that post-
sentence delays exceeding three months—or 9.4 months if outliers are included—
failed to enjoy “long usage” in the eighteenth century. Further, as a corollary point, 
the crime-to-execution chart—with 108 prisoners—demonstrates that post-crime 
delays exceeding 12.83 months did not enjoy “long usage” in the eighteenth century. 
Whether one adopts the sentence-to-execution data (with or without outliers) or the 
crime-to-execution data, decade-long delays are thousands of days astray from any 
delay that enjoyed “long usage” in Anglo-American common law. 
IV. MODERN DELAYS ON DEATH ROW ARE CONTRARY TO LONG USAGE 
The sentence-to-execution delay did not balloon immediately after the States 
ratified the Eighth Amendment in the eighteenth century. The Supreme Court, almost 
one-hundred years later, recognized in In re Medley that extensive delays on death 
row—four weeks in that case—may unconstitutionally increase a capital defendant’s 
punishment.112 The Court worried about the inmate’s mental health because solitary 
confinement “was an additional punishment of the most important and painful 
character.” 113 In re Medley pointed to prior penitentiary systems that had solitary 
confinement only and recalled that a “considerable number of the prisoners fell, after 
even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to 
impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane . . . [or] committed 
suicide.”114 Yet the Court’s concern in In re Medley—four weeks in solitary 
confinement—started dwindling when death penalty litigation became a heated topic 
in the 1970s.  
 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111
 The crime-to-execution chart also includes the time taken to catch, arrest, convict, and 
sentence the defendant.  
112
 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890). 
113 Id. at 171. 
114 Id. at 168. Moreover, the state law at issue in Medley did not permit prison wardens to 
inform death row inmates of their execution date and, therefore, many death row inmates 
suffered from severe mental anxiety because they never knew which meal would be their last 
meal. The Court held that such uncertainty increased each death row inmate’s punishment. Id. 
at 172. 
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A. Sentence-to-Execution Delay from 1930 to 2013 
Sentence-to-execution delays started to significantly increase in part because of 
the Supreme Court’s capital-punishment jurisprudence in the 1970s. Initially, from 
1930 to 1970, the average sentence-to-execution delay was approximately 37 
months.115 But in 1972, Furman v. Georgia held that capital punishment violated the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.116 Four years later, Gregg v. Georgia reinstated 
the death penalty in part because “meaningful appellate review” would be “available 
to ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish 
manner.”117 This meaningful-appeal requirement sparked a lengthier and more 
complex appellate process. The average sentence-to-execution delay on death row 
increased to seventy-four months in 1984—only eight years after Gregg v. 
Georgia.118 The chart below tells the rest of the story for 1984 to 2013. 
 
115
 See U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1973 467 tbl. 
6.145 (1973). 
116 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam). 
117 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
118 Table 3’s data derives from the Death Penalty Information Center. See Time on Death Row, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/death-row-time-on-death-
row (last visited Feb. 4, 2020). 
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The average sentence-to-execution delay was ten years in 1994, expanded to 
almost twelve years in 1999, and increased to fourteen years in 2009.119 At its worst 
moment, the average sentence-to-execution delay was 16.5 years in 2011, but recently 
it decreased to 15.5 years in 2013.120 Those numbers are mere averages and, 
consequently, do not highlight death row inmates who spend thirty to forty years in 
solitary confinement while awaiting execution.121  
A few Supreme Court Justices have already discussed extensive delays on death 
row. That discussion mostly transpired from 1995 to 2000 when Justices John Paul 
Stevens and Stephen Breyer dissented from the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari to 
decide whether extensive delays on death row violate the Eighth Amendment.122  
 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See Examples of Prisoners with Extraordinarily Long Stays on Death Row, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/death-row-time-on-death-
row/examples-of-prisoners-with-extraordinarily-long-stays-on-death-row (last visited Feb. 4, 
2020). 
122
 See infra text accompanying notes 123–33. Justice Breyer once again noted his concerns 
in 2015. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In that case, 
Justice Breyer argued that “unconscionably long delays . . . undermine the death penalty’s 
penological purpose.” Id. He also noted that “unless we abandon the procedural requirements 
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1. Lackey and Its Progeny 
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to deem decade-long delays “unusual” 
under the Eighth Amendment in 1995 when Clarence Lackey’s certiorari petition 
asserted that an execution—after seventeen years of delay—entailed “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”123 Instead, the Court simply kicked the can down the road. 
Justice Stevens, in a denial from dissent, argued that a seventeen-year delay “certainly 
would have been rare in 1789, and thus the practice of the Framers would not justify 
a denial of petitioner’s claim.”124 He also suggested, as Beccaria did, that decade-long 
delays do not further penological goals, such as deterrence.125  
Three years later, in Elledge v. Florida, Justice Breyer argued that the Supreme 
Court should grant certiorari to decide the excessive-delay problem.126 He claimed 
that “twenty-three years under sentence of death is unusual” when considering “the 
practice in this country and England at the time our Constitution was written.”127 
Moreover, “an execution may well cease to serve the legitimate penological purposes 
that otherwise provide a necessary constitutional justification for the death penalty” 
once the prisoner awaits punishment for decades.128 As support, Justice Breyer cited 
late eighteenth-century documents. Specifically, he cited Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s clemency petition in 1793 for a capital defendant—which was granted—
because the prisoner awaited execution for five months.129 He also cited Thomas 
Jefferson’s Bill in 1779 that required execution to be conducted only two days after 
any death sentence.130  
Justice Breyer, only one year after Elledge v. Florida, once again requested that 
the Supreme Court grant certiorari in Knight v. Florida to decide whether decade-long 
delays violate the Eighth Amendment.131 The defendant in Knight experienced a 
 
that assure fairness and reliability, we are forced to confront the problem of increasingly lengthy 
delays in capital cases.” Id. at 2764. 
123
 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of 
certiorari). 
124
 Id. 
125 Id. 
126
 Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 945. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131
 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
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twenty-five-year delay on death row.132 Justice Breyer emphasized that it “is difficult 
to deny the suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution.”133  
Justice Breyer’s arguments in Elledge and Knight, in addition to Justice Stevens’s 
argument in Lackey, are correct. Decade-long delays on death row are a new 
innovation since the eighteenth century. Evidence proves that a sentence-to-execution 
delay enjoyed “long usage” only if it did not exceed three months (excluding 
outliers)134 or 9.4 months (including outliers).135 Yet contemporary death row 
inmates experienced an average of 15.5 years on death row in 2013.136 That 15.5-year 
average delay—in comparison to the average sentence-to-execution delay in the 
eighteenth century—produces 6,100% more time awaiting execution on death row 
(186 months instead of three months). If outliers are included, on the other hand, 
current death row inmates are experiencing 1,878% more time awaiting execution on 
death row than eighteenth-century prisoners (186 months instead of 9.4 months).  
America’s framers did not tolerate a punishment system that forced prisoners to 
suffer and agonize over death for fifteen or sixteen years in solitary confinement. The 
common law system in the eighteenth century envisioned a swift capital punishment 
process.137 That is why decade-long execution delays did not enjoy “long usage” in 
Anglo-American law. Today’s capital offenders are not only getting sentenced to 
death, but they are serving long terms of imprisonment in solitary confinement before 
being put to death.138   
2. Blame-the-Prisoner Argument 
Justice Thomas, in Thompson v. McNeil, concurred in the Supreme Court’s denial 
of certiorari and, moreover, responded to Justice Breyer’s extensive-delay 
argument.139 It would make “a mockery of our system of justice,” Justice Thomas 
argues, “for a convicted murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of delay” 
postpones his or her sentence with appeals and then claims that postponement to be 
unconstitutional.140 Justice Thomas likely would respond to this Article’s position by 
 
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 See supra Table 1. Ninety-six percent of prisoners from 1770 to 1791 did not experience a 
sentence-to-execution delay that exceeded three months.  
135 Id. 
136
 See supra Table 3.  
137
 See Part III.A. 
138 See generally Michael Johnson, Fifteen Years and Death: Double Jeopardy, Multiple 
Punishments, and Extended Stays on Death Row, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85 (2014). 
139
 Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari).  
140
 Id. at 1117 (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., 
concurring)). 
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arguing that sentence-to-execution-delay arguments are waived once the prisoner 
expands his or her time on death row via appeals. Justice Thomas’s argument fails for 
multiple reasons.   
First, as Justice Breyer argued, Justice Thomas does not properly distinguish a 
delay caused by “constitutionally defective death-penalty procedures” from a delay 
that is the defendant’s fault.141 The complexity of the capital punishment system, 
combined with a lack of resources, often pushes the appeals process from a few years 
to a few decades. No appeals process should take thirty years to review a legal 
decision. So, it is not surprising that other systemic delays, not caused by the 
defendant, are the core problem. Some death row inmates wait eight to ten years just 
to get a habeas counsel appointed.142 Further, Judge Arthur Alarcón recently 
demonstrated twenty additional systemic delays in the capital punishment process.143 
Not all of those delays are the defendant’s fault.   
Second, a death row inmate’s case may involve appeals that are in fact against the 
inmate’s wishes. Courts permit a “next friend” to litigate any inmate’s appeals if that 
friend “appears in court on behalf” of a detained prisoner who is “unable to seek 
relief.”144 This often transpires when the next friend—which may include a public 
defender’s office—possesses evidence that the death row inmate is not competent to 
waive his or her appeals. Michael Eggers’s attempted waiver is illustrative.145 He 
explicitly told his attorneys in December 2005 to “BUGG OFF! SCRAM! GET OUT 
OF HERE! YOU’RE FIRED! YOU ARE NO LONGER NEEDED! HIT THE 
BRICKS, THE HIGHWAY, THE ROAD! CATCH OUT! GO FLY A KITE ON THE 
FREEWAY!”146 Instead, the federal public defender’s office argued that Eggers was 
incompetent, and Eggers remained in solitary confinement for thirteen more years 
while the appeals process churned on—despite his sincere effort to waive all 
appeals.147 Eggers’s thirteen-year wait significantly exceeded any acceptable delay in 
Anglo-American law from 1770 to 1791.   
Finally, let us assume that Justice Thomas is correct: a mentally competent 
defendant must waive all appeals before arguing that excessive delays are “unusual” 
under the Eighth Amendment. Justice Thomas’s argument still fails because sentence-
to-execution delays would exceed three months due to other systemic delays present 
 
141 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
142 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 122 (2008) [hereinafter 
FINAL REPORT]. 
143 Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
697, 707–08 (2007). 
144 Chinyerum N. Okpara, Forced into Execution: Involuntarily Medicating Mentally Ill 
Inmates to Achieve Competency for Execution, 43 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 10 (2019) (citations 
omitted). 
145
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Eggers v. Alabama, 876 F.3d 1086 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 
16-10785). 
146
 Id. 
147
 See generally id. 
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when a death row inmate “volunteers” for death. For instance, a death row inmate may 
waive all appeals only after a court deems the defendant competent to “volunteer” for 
death.148 Those competency hearings—in which psychiatrists and other professionals 
evaluate the inmate—cannot be waived because of twenty-first-century due process 
rights.149  
The case of Michael Ross is illustrative.150 There, Ross fought to overturn his 
capital sentence for almost twenty years.151 Yet, on September 11, 2004, Ross’s 
lawyers informed the judge that he wanted to waive his appeal.152 In response, the 
public defender’s office argued that Ross was not competent to waive his appeal.153 
The state prosecutor countered with a motion to determine Ross’s competency.154 On 
December 9, 2004, the court ordered Ross to complete a competency examination and, 
in turn, a psychiatrist examined Ross.155  
More litigation ensued—not at Ross’s request—which resulted in a competency 
hearing being scheduled in April 2005.156 The public defender’s office eventually lost 
and Ross was executed on May 14, 2005, more than six months after Ross first 
attempted to waive his appeal.157 Ross’s six-month delay did not enjoy long usage in 
the eighteenth-century common law because no sentence-to-execution delay 
exceeding three months (excluding outliers) enjoyed “long usage” from 1770 to 
1791.158  
But if outliers are included, Ross’s six-month delay would have enjoyed long 
usage in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, other systemic delays—such as the 
initial appointment of habeas counsel,159 moratoria by states due to drug 
 
148
 See generally Paula Shapiro, Are We Executing Mentally Incompetent Inmates Because 
They Volunteer to Die?: A Look at Various States’ Implementation of Standards of Competency 
to Waive Post-Conviction Review, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 567, 568 (2008). 
149 Id. 
150 Stephen Blank, Killing Time: The Process of Waiving Appeal the Michael Ross Death 
Penalty Cases, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 735, 746 (2006). 
151 Id. at 777. 
152 Id. at 736. 
153 Id. at 741.  
154 Id. 
155
 Id. 
156 Id. at 746. 
157 Id. at 777. 
158 See supra Part III.B. 
159 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 134.  
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complications,160 courts taking more time to “get it right,”161 and automatic appeals 
under state law162—could easily extend the delay enough to exceed 9.4 months. That 
is exactly what happened to Steven Spears in Georgia, whose story is comprehensively 
discussed below, when a Georgia law required an automatic appeal after any death 
sentence. Spears requested death from the moment he was convicted at trial.163 He 
never helped his attorneys with any appeal but, due to both Georgia’s automatic-
appeal law and an alleged ex-wife litigating as a “next friend,” Spears suffered on 
death row for almost ten years.164  
B. The Tale of Two Different Eras: 1789 vs. 2016 
Telling the stories of two capital defendants, who were executed 227 years apart, 
will display how contemporary death row inmates are suffering abundantly more than 
eighteenth-century capital defendants. This section will narrate the story of (1) Rachel 
Wall, who was executed in Massachusetts in 1789, and (2) Steven Spears, who was 
executed in Georgia in 2016. Wall and Spears endured dissimilar endings.  
Wall, hanged one month after her sentence, spent her last moments thanking 
everyone involved in the process, including the prosecutor and witnesses that may 
have wrongly convicted her.165 Wall never hinted that she was being tortured while 
 
160 See, e.g., Morales v. Cate, 623 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding four-year 
moratorium on death penalty due to lethal-injection complications). 
161 Courts often reject excessive delay claims because “delay, in large part, is a function of the 
desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore exhaustively, or at least 
sufficiently, any argument that might save someone's life.” Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 
560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998). This counter argument asserts that accuracy in capital punishment 
cases is so important that prisoners must tolerate lengthier delays. But courts may not delay 
other constitutional rights for 20 to 30 years—such as the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
trial—to simply “get it right.” Trial delays are permitted for more “serious, complex” charges, 
but that exception often applies to litigation with numerous criminal defendants. Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–31 (1972). Thus, courts must “get it right” within the time permitted 
under the Sixth Amendment. So too here in the Eighth Amendment context. Once a death row 
inmate has been psychologically and physically tortured for 3 months (excluding outliers), the 
Eighth Amendment’s permissible clock runs out, despite the inmate’s invocation of habeas 
corpus in part contributing to the delay. 
162
 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239 (West 2004).  
163 Rhonda Cook, Killer Still Refuses to Appeal Sentence as Execution Date Nears, AJC (Nov. 
9, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/killer-still-refuses-appeal-sentence-execution-date-
nears/AYygN00tZoNd1O7IhBFcHN/ [hereinafter Cook, Killer Still Refuses to Appeal]. 
164 David Beasley, State of Georgia Executes Inmate for Strangulation Murder of Ex-
Girlfriend, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-georgia-
execution/state-of-georgia-executes-inmate-for-strangulation-murder-of-ex-girlfriend-
idUSKBN13B1DV.  
165 RACHELL WALL, LIFE, LAST WORDS AND DYING CONFESSION, OF RACHEL WALL, WHO, 
WITH WHOM WILLIAM SMITH AND WILLIAM DUNOGAN, WERE EXECUTED AT BOSTON, ON 
THURSDAY OCTOBER 8, 1789, FOR HIGH-WAY ROBBERY (1789) [hereinafter RACHEL WALL 
DYING CONFESSION].  
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awaiting execution in prison.166 And she never begged for her life to end.167 Steven 
Spears, on the other hand, begged for his lethal injection after spending almost ten 
years in solitary confinement in Georgia.168 He analogized each day awaiting 
execution to “a cancer eating [him] up every day.”169  
1. Rachel Wall 
Rachel Wall was born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania in 1760.170 Wall, a devout 
Christian who grew up on a farm, eventually abandoned the farm life and began 
traveling in colonial America.171 On this trip, she met and married George Wall.172 
The newlyweds traveled to Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.173 The couple 
struggled to financially survive and, upset with that unfortunate circumstance, George 
deserted Rachel while the couple was in Boston.174 She remained in Boston without 
any income or hope and was forced into prostitution to survive.175  
The prostitution proceeds did not fully support Wall, and she thus decided to 
become a career thief. Wall was eventually convicted of grand larceny in Boston in 
1785.176 That crime involved stealing goods from one of Boston’s most well-known 
lawyers, Perez Morton.177 Wall then transformed her specialty from thievery to 
piracy.178 She secretly tiptoed on docked ships in Boston at night. Wall pocketed 
“upwards of thirty pounds, in gold, crowns, and small change” from a ship at Long-
 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168
 Rhonda Cook, Georgia Executes Steven Spears for 2001 Murder, AJC (Nov. 16, 2016), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/georgia-executes-steven-spears-for-2001-
murder/75Cr3QHMskGHT7POypFeNJ/ [hereinafter Cook, Steven Spears]. 
169 Id. 
170
 RACHEL WALL DYING CONFESSION, supra note 165.  
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173
 Id. 
174 HEARN, NEW ENGLAND, supra note 86, at 176.  
175
 See id. 
176 Id. 
177 ALAN ROGERS, MURDER AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN MASSACHUSETTS 50 (2008). The 
Boston Court of Law sentenced Wall to 15 lashes and three years of indentured servitude. 
HEARN, NEW ENGLAND, supra note 86, at 179. 
178
 RACHEL WALL DYING CONFESSION, supra note 165.   
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Wharf in 1787.179 She also lifted a silver watch, silver buckles, and pocket-money 
from another ship docked at Doane’s Wharf in 1788.180  
Wall finally went too far. She attacked a female pedestrian, Margaret Bender, 
along one of Boston’s most active streets.181 Wall clobbered Bender, placed a 
handkerchief in her mouth, and lifted her bonnet and shoes.182 Pedestrians detained 
Wall and, in turn, Boston charged her with highway robbery—a capital offense.183 
Attorney General Robert T. Paine aggressively prosecuted Wall’s highway-robbery 
case.184 Wall’s appointed attorneys, James Hugh and Christopher Gore, claimed that 
no bonnet or shoes were found on Wall’s person upon detention and, therefore, the 
pedestrians had detained the incorrect person.185 The jury did not take the bait.  
The jury found Wall guilty of highway robbery despite Massachusetts never 
having previously executed a woman for that crime.186 On September 8, 1789, Wall 
received her sentence of death.187 Wall petitioned Massachusetts’s Governor, John 
Hancock, for clemency, but Governor Hancock rejected her petition.188 He reasoned 
that it was time to show women in Massachusetts that they would be held liable for 
crimes like male citizens were in 1789.189 On October 7, 1789, while providing her 
dying confession, Wall confessed to several petty crimes but insisted that she did not 
commit the highway-robbery offense.190  
Most importantly, in her dying confession, Wall did not critique her prison 
conditions or the people who participated in her trial.191 Instead, she stated, “I return 
my sincere thanks to the [Honorable] gentlemen who were my Judges, for assigning 
me counsel, and to them for their kindness in pleading my cause.”192 Wall did not stop 
there. “I likewise return my hearty thanks to the several Ministers of the town, who 
have attended me since I have been under sentence” and “other kind friends, for the 
 
179
 Id. 
180
 Id. 
181 ROGERS, supra note 177, at 51. 
182 Id. 
183
 HEARN, NEW ENGLAND, supra note 86, at 176. 
184 ROGERS, supra note 177, at 51. 
185
 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 BILL BOWERS, GREAT AMERICAN CRIME STORIES: LYONS PRESS CLASSICS 145–46 (2017). 
188
 HEARN, NEW ENGLAND, supra note 86, at 176. 
189
 Id. 
190
 RACHEL WALL DYING CONFESSION, supra note 165. 
191
 Id. 
192
 Id. 
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care they have shewn to me, both for soul and body, which gratitude obliges me to 
acknowledge.”193  
Those words—conveyed only one day before her death on October 8, 1789—
displayed no outward signs of torture, disgust, or delay from imprisonment or any 
other treatment while awaiting execution. Wall did not want her life to end but, on 
October 8, 1789, she became the first woman to be executed in Massachusetts for 
highway robbery.194  
2. Steven Spears 
Steven Spears’s journey to death row began once he started dating Sherri 
Holland.195 Spears and Holland dated for roughly three years in Georgia, but the 
couple eventually separated in 2001.196 Spears believed that Holland was cheating on 
him and, in turn, promised that he would “choke her ass to death” if Holland ever was 
romantic with another man.197 He kept that promise several months after he and 
Holland terminated their relationship.198 Spears contemplated four distinct methods 
to murder Holland: electrocution, strangulation, physical abuse, and with a firearm.199 
He chose strangulation.200  
On August 25, 2001, Spears secretly entered Holland’s home and remained in her 
young son’s closet.201 After Holland arrived home, Spears loomed in the background 
until Holland fell asleep in her bedroom.202 He subsequently entered the bedroom and 
strangled Holland until her body went limp.203 Spears placed a garbage bag over 
Holland’s head, secured it with duct tape, locked the bedroom door, and departed in 
Holland’s vehicle.204 He eventually abandoned that vehicle and disappeared in the 
 
193 Id. 
194 ROGERS, supra note 177, at 51. 
195 Spears v. State, 769 S.E.2d 337, 341 (Ga. 2015). 
196 Brief of Appellee-Respondent at 8, Spears v. State, 769 S.E.2d 337 (Ga. 2015) (No. 
S14P1344).   
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199
 Id. at 9.  
200 Id. 
201 Spears v. State, 769 S.E.2d 337, 341 (Ga. 2015). 
202 Id. 
203
 See id. at 600. 
204
 Id. 
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woods for days until located by a Georgia police officer.205 He voluntarily admitted 
to murdering Holland once arrested by that officer.206  
Spears was charged and convicted of numerous counts on March 21, 2007.207 He 
heatedly forbade his lawyers from presenting any mitigation evidence during the 
sentencing phase of the trial.208 He even threatened to murder his lawyers if they 
argued for a life sentence.209 Spears also refused to permit his lawyers to pursue any 
post-conviction appeal.210 Yet his alleged ex-wife,211 Gwen Thompson, filed a 
petition as his “next friend” to appeal Spears’s death sentence. In response, Spears told 
the judge that his lawyers and Thompson were “trying to force their beliefs on me.”212 
The judge eventually ordered a competency hearing and, when the selected 
psychiatrist asked Spears if he wanted to be executed, he stated, “[n]ot really, but 
would you want to live in a six by nine cell. That’s not living.”213 
Spears conceded that he did not desire to pursue post-conviction relief because it 
entailed “about another ten to fifteen years” in solitary confinement.214 He 
emphasized that the “process takes so long” and explained that extensive delays are 
“what’s wrong with the death penalty.”215 By awaiting execution in solitary 
confinement for almost ten years, each day became “a cancer eating [him] up.”216 
Spears finally stopped suffering from that “cancer” on November 16, 2016, when he 
was executed via lethal injection.217 Spears—unlike Rachel Wall who did not 
complain about prison conditions and did not yearn for her execution date—was ready 
for his lethal injection. Spears did not provide any last words.  
 
205
 Id. 
206 Id. at 601. 
207 The counts included malice murder, felony murder while in commission of aggravated 
assault, felony murder while in commission of kidnapping, aggravated assault, kidnapping with 
bodily injury, burglary with intent to commit theft, and burglary with intent to commit murder. 
Id. at 598 n.1. 
208 Cook, Killer Still Refuses to Appeal, supra note 163. 
209
 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Spears denied that he and Thompson were ever married. Georgia Executes 8th Person This 
Year, CBS NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steven-frederick-spears-
georgia-executes-8th-person-this-year/. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 See Cook, Steven Spears, supra note 168. 
217 Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution’s framers understood that capital punishment would be 
permissible in the United States. But the framers did not envision government 
permitting a version of the death penalty in which prisoners endure fifteen years of 
agonizing and tormenting delays. Instead, swift and immediate punishment reigned as 
supreme and necessary. The framers imagined execution delays akin to what Rachel 
Wall experienced: a month or so. That is why no sentence-to-execution delay 
exceeding three months (excluding outliers) enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth-
century common law. Thus, contemporary delays—under Bucklew v. Precythe’s 
apparent adoption of Stinneford’s interpretation—are “unusual” under the Eighth 
Amendment because such delays did not enjoy long usage in the eighteenth-century 
common law.  
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APPENDIX: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CASES IN NEW ENGLAND, NEW YORK, AND NEW 
JERSEY 
 
New England 
Prisoner Trial/Conviction/ 
Sentence Date 
Execution 
Date 
Trial/Conviction/Sentence 
Source 
William 
Shaw 
Convicted 
10/03/1770 
12/13/1770 BENJAMIN LYNDE, JR., THE 
DIARIES OF BENJAMIN LYNDE 
AND OF BENJAMIN LYNDE, JR. 
199 (photo. reprint) (1880). 
Moses Paul Convicted 
12/20/1772 
9/02/1772 SAMSON OCCOM, THE 
COLLECTED WRITINGS OF 
SAMSON OCCOM, MOHEGAN: 
LEADERSHIP AND 
LITERATURE IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY NATIVE AMERICA 
195 (Joanna Brooks ed., 
2006).  
Moses 
Dunbar 
Tried 01/23/1777 03/19/1777 BRISTOL, CONNECTICUT, IN 
THE OLDEN TIME "NEW 
CAMBRIDGE" WHICH 
INCLUDES FORESTVILLE 148–
49 (1907). 
Robert 
Thompson 
Convicted 
04/21/1777 
06/09/1777 EDMUND R. THOMPSON, 
SECRET NEW ENGLAND: 
SPIES OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 157 (1991).  
David 
Redding 
Tried 06/06/1778 06/11/1778 JOHN J. DUFFY ET AL., THE 
VERMONT ENCYCLOPEDIA 
245 (2003).  
James 
Buchanan 
Convicted 
04/24/1778 
07/02/1778 2 PELEG W. CHANDLER, 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
43 (1844). 
William 
Brooks 
Convicted 
04/24/1778 
07/02/1778 2 PELEG W. CHANDLER, 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
43 (1844). 
Ezra Ross Convicted 
04/24/1778 
07/02/1778 2 PELEG W. CHANDLER, 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
43 (1844). 
Batsheba 
Spooner 
Convicted 
04/24/1778 
07/02/1778 2 PELEG W. CHANDLER, 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
43 (1844). 
Barnett 
Davenport 
Convicted 
04/25/1780 
05/08/1780 PETER C. VERMILYEA, 
WICKED LITCHFIELD COUNTY 
57 (2016).  
Jeremiah 
Braun 
Tried 08/23/1780 
or 08/24/1780 
08/24/1780 
or 
08/25/1780 
CYRUS EATON, HISTORY OF 
THOMASTON, ROCKLAND, 
AND SOUTH THOMASTON, 
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MAINE: FROM THEIR FIRST 
EXPLORATION, A. D. 1605; 
WITH FAMILY GENEALOGIES 
139–40 (2001).  
John Dixon Tried 11/04/1784 11/11/1784 BOSTON’S HISTORIES: ESSAYS 
IN HONOR OF THOMAS H. 
O’CONNOR 20 (James M. 
O’Toole & David Quigley 
eds., 2004). 
Thomas 
Goss 
Sentenced 
08/11/1785 
11/07/1785 Litchfield, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Aug. 29, 1786, at 
2. 
Hanna 
Occuish  
Sentenced 
10/06/1786 
12/20/1786 New London, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Oct. 9, 1786, at 3. 
Issac 
Combs 
Sentenced 
07/04/1786 
12/21/1786 MARTHA J. MCNAMARA, 
FROM TAVERN TO 
COURTHOUSE: 
ARCHITECTURE AND RITUAL 
IN AMERICAN LAW, 1658–
1860 55–56 (Gregory Conniff 
et al. eds., 2004) (quoting 
WILLIAM PYNCHON, DIARY 
OF WILLIAM PYNCHON OF 
SALEM 261 (Fitch Edward 
Oliver ed., 1890)).  
William 
Smith 
Sentenced 
09/08/1789 
10/08/1789 INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 
(Boston), September 10, 
1789. 
William 
Denoffee 
Sentenced 
09/08/1789 
10/08/1789 INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 
(Boston), September 10, 
1789. 
Rachel 
Wall 
Sentenced 
09/08/1789 
10/08/1789 INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 
(Boston), September 10, 
1789. 
Thomas 
Bird 
Convicted 
06/05/1790 
06/25/1790 JERRY GENESIO, PORTLAND 
NECK: THE HANGING OF 
THOMAS BIRD 48–49, 52 
(2010).  
 
 
New York 
Prisoner Trial/Conviction/ 
Sentence Date 
Execution 
Date 
Trial/Conviction/Sentence 
Source 
Mary Daily Convicted 
04/27/1771 
05/10/1771 DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL 
EXECUTIONS IN NEW YORK 
STATE: A COMPREHENSIVE 
REFERENCE, 1639-1963 17 
(1997). 
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Gilbert 
Belcher 
Convicted 01/27/73 04/02/1773 2 NEW YORK STATE LIBRARY, 
85TH ANNUAL REPORT 494 
(1902).  
 
John Lovey Convicted 01/27/73 04/02/1773 2 NEW YORK STATE LIBRARY, 
85TH ANNUAL REPORT 494 
(1902).  
 
Thomas 
Hickey 
Sentenced 
06/28/1776 
06/28/1776 HENRY P. JOHNSTON, THE 
CAMPAIGN OF 1776 AROUND 
NEW YORK AND BROOKLYN 
92 n.2 (1878).  
 
Nathan 
Hale 
Sentenced 
09/21/1776 
09/22/1776 DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL 
EXECUTIONS IN NEW YORK 
STATE: A COMPREHENSIVE 
REFERENCE, 1639-1963 19 
(1997). John 
Williams 
Tried 04/13/1777 05/09/1777 ALEXANDER ROSE, 
WASHINGTON’S SPIES: THE 
STORY OF AMERICA’S FIRST 
SPY RING 51–52 (2006).  
Jacob 
Middagh 
Convicted 
05/03/1777 
05/28/1777 MARIUS SCHOONMAKER, THE 
HISTORY OF KINGSTON, NEW 
YORK 254 (1888).  
Jacob 
Roosa 
Convicted 
05/03/1777 
05/28/1777 MARIUS SCHOONMAKER, THE 
HISTORY OF KINGSTON, NEW 
YORK 254 (1888).  
Edmund 
Palmer 
Sentenced 
07/24/1777 
08/08/1777 ROBERT E. HUBBARD, MAJOR 
GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM: 
HERO OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 141–42 (2017). 
Daniel 
Taylor 
Tried 10/14/1777 10/18/1777 ALEXANDER ROSE, 
WASHINGTON’S SPIES: THE 
STORY OF AMERICA’S FIRST 
SPY RING 58 (2006). 
Claudius 
Smith 
Sentenced 
01/11/1779 
01/22/1779 EDWARD M. RUTTENBER, 
CATALOGUE OF 
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN 
WASHINGTON'S HEAD-
QUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y: 
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH, 
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES 
OF REVOLUTIONARY 
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34 
(1890).  
Thomas 
Delamar 
Sentenced 
01/11/1779 
01/22/1779 EDWARD M. RUTTENBER, 
CATALOGUE OF 
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN 
WASHINGTON'S HEAD-
QUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y: 
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WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH, 
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES 
OF REVOLUTIONARY 
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34 
(1890).  
James 
Gordon 
Sentenced 
01/11/1779 
01/22/1779 EDWARD M. RUTTENBER, 
CATALOGUE OF 
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN 
WASHINGTON'S HEAD-
QUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y: 
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH, 
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES 
OF REVOLUTIONARY 
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34 
(1890). 
James 
Fluelling 
Sentenced 
06/02/1779 
06/08/1779 EDWARD M. RUTTENBER, 
CATALOGUE OF 
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN 
WASHINGTON'S HEAD-
QUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y: 
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH, 
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES 
OF REVOLUTIONARY 
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34 
(1890). 
Daniel 
Keith 
Sentenced 
06/02/1779 
06/08/1779 EDWARD M. RUTTENBER, 
CATALOGUE OF 
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN 
WASHINGTON'S HEAD-
QUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y: 
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH, 
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES 
OF REVOLUTIONARY 
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34 
(1890).  
James 
McCormick 
Sentenced 
06/02/1779 
06/08/1779 EDWARD M. RUTTENBER, 
CATALOGUE OF 
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN 
WASHINGTON'S HEAD-
QUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y: 
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH, 
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES 
OF REVOLUTIONARY 
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34 
(1890).  
James 
Smith 
Sentenced 
06/02/1779 
06/08/1779 EDWARD M. RUTTENBER, 
CATALOGUE OF 
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN 
WASHINGTON'S HEAD-
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QUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y: 
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH, 
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES 
OF REVOLUTIONARY 
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34 
(1890).  
John Andre Convicted 
09/29/1780 
10/02/1780 
 
SPENCER C. TUCKER, 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE 
DEFINITIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
AND DOCUMENT COLLECTION 
29 (2018).  
Wheeler Sentenced 
12/15/1781 
12/22/1781 KENNETH SCOTT, 
GENEALOGICAL DATA FROM 
COLONIAL NEW YORK 
NEWSPAPERS: A 
CONSOLIDATION OF ARTICLES 
FROM THE NEW YORK 
GENEALOGICAL AND 
BIOGRAPHICAL RECORD 235 
(2004). 
Wood Sentenced 
12/15/1781 
12/22/1781 KENNETH SCOTT, 
GENEALOGICAL DATA FROM 
COLONIAL NEW YORK 
NEWSPAPERS: A 
CONSOLIDATION OF ARTICLES 
FROM THE NEW YORK 
GENEALOGICAL AND 
BIOGRAPHICAL RECORD 235 
(2004). 
Chris-
topher 
Cooper 
Convicted 
04/26/1785 
06/18/1785 2 JOEL MUNSELL, THE 
ANNALS OF ALBANY 293 (2d 
ed. 1870). 
Petrus 
Cooper 
Convicted 
04/26/1785 
06/18/1785 2 JOEL MUNSELL, THE 
ANNALS OF ALBANY 293 (2d 
ed. 1870). 
 
New Jersey 
Prisoner Trial/Conviction/Se
ntence Date 
Execution 
Date 
Trial/Conviction/Sentence 
Source 
Cadry Lacy Sentenced 
04/13/1770 
04/26/1770 Arrivals, PENNSYLVANIA 
GAZETTE, Apr. 19, 1770. 
William 
Reed 
Sentenced 
05/16/1772 
05/30/1772 Philadelphia, PENNSYLVANIA 
PACKET, June 1, 1772, at 3. 
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Peter 
Galwin 
Sentenced 
11/12/1774 
12/05/1774 Rivington’s New-York 
Gazetter, November 24, 1774. 
John Taylor Sentenced 
11/12/1774 
12/05/1774 Rivington’s New-York 
Gazetter, November 24, 1774. 
Thomas 
Long 
Tried 11/01/1779 11/04/1779 DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL 
EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY: 
A COMPREHENSIVE 
REGISTRY, 1691-1963 42 
(2005). 
James 
Hammel 
Tried 02/18/1780 02/19/1780 ANTHONY M. SHERMAN, 
HISTORIC MORRISTOWN, 
NEW JERSEY: THE STORY OF 
ITS FIRST CENTURY 306 
(1905). 
Tobey Tried 06/21/1780 06/24/1780 DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL 
EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY: 
A COMPREHENSIVE 
REGISTRY, 1691-1963 46 
(2005). 
David 
Gilmore 
Tried 01/26/1781 01/27/1781 DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL 
EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY: 
A COMPREHENSIVE 
REGISTRY, 1691-1963 50–51 
(2005). 
John Tuttle Tried 01/26/1781 01/27/1781 DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL 
EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY: 
A COMPREHENSIVE 
REGISTRY, 1691-1963 50–51 
(2005). 
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